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ABSTRACT 
P2P lending is a method of informal finance that uses the internet to connect 
borrowers with on-line communities. Through limited participation of financial 
intermediaries, P2P credit becomes a new model for unsecured loan 
origination. The question framing this research is: What are the elements that 
could help on-line financiers characterize default risk in these loans? It 
attempts to advance knowledge about P2P default determinants, from the 
perspective of the availability of information to on-line lending communities in 
emerging countries. With the aid of a logistic regression model and data 
provided by Mexican platforms and public information available to on-line 
investors, this inquiry explores the effect of credit scores and other variables 
related to loan and borrower´s characteristics over P2P default behavior. The 
results showed that information provided by the platform is relevant for 
analyzing credit risk, yet not conclusive. In congruence with the literature, on 
a scale going from the safest to the riskiest, loan quality is positively 
associated with default behavior. Other determinants for increasing the odds 
of default are the payment-to-income ratio and having been refinanced on the 
same platform. On the contrary loan purpose and being a female applicant 
reduce such odds. Evidence from the sample showed that under equal credit 
conditions, a case for differential default behavior among variations in 
gender, age or geographical location, could not be established. However it 
was found that having controlled for loan quality, women have longer loan 
survival times than men. This is one of the first studies about debt 
crowdfunding in Latin America and Mexico. Implications for lenders, 
researchers and policy-makers are also discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 New means of project sourcing have flourished with the advent of the Web 2.0 
and the upcoming popularity of online communities (ITURBIDE; CANFIELD, 2015). 
On-line financing and the development of crowdfunding platforms (CF) that evolved 
from the Fintech ecosystem constitute an example of a disruptive business model 
innovation (MARKIDES, 2006).  
 With limited participation of financial intermediaries, online peer-to-peer (P2P) 
or market-place lending becomes a new model for unsecured loan origination 
(GALLOWAY, 2009), where anonymous backers parcel the amount loaned. 
Allegedly P2P lending constitutes a good alternative for the financing community. 
Borrowers receive better credit conditions than in traditional finance; Creditors take 
advantage of an investment model where risk is coupled to the credit rating of the 
funded loans (BACHMANN, et al., 2011) and  lending websites benefit by raising 
fees for successfully realized transactions.   
 P2P lending initiated in the U.K with the first online lending platform, Zopa 
(HULME; WRIGHT, 2006) and is also developing apace around the world (WAN et 
al. 2016; WEISS et al. 2010; BERGER; GLEISNER, 2009). Various P2P platforms 
have evolved from the Mexican Fintech ecosystem; some of them operate nation-
wide.  The loan approval rate for these platforms is less than 5%, a common figure 
for this type of financial product (HAND; HENLEY, 1997).   
 The purpose of this article is to attain further understanding about applicants´ 
delinquent credit behavior in P2P lending activities, in emerging markets, particularly 
in the Mexican context.  
 This study will address the following question: 1) what are the elements that 
could help on-line financiers characterize default risk in these loans?  
 Platforms collect information about the applicants and feed their credit rating 
algorithm. As it´s the case of many on-line lending sites, each loan is classified 
according to its risk characteristics, assigning a corresponding loan rate believed to 
capture credit risk. Grades and loan rates increase with the evaluated risk. In our 
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 sample, over a reverse scale, loan quality is measured ranging from A down to G, 
with three notches each; Where Grade A defines the highest quality loans charging 
8.9% p.a., and Grade G, which contains the riskier credits, charges 28.9% p.a. in the 
lowest notch. 
 Arguably, some of the most important sources of concern for lenders in credit 
markets derive from information asymmetry (IA), which stems from the fact, that 
borrowers are better informed than lenders on at least two conditions that basically 
shape credit and re-investment risks: (i) the ability and willingness to repay the debt 
and (ii) the propensity for early payment. in this research, only credit risk arising from 
default behavior is analyzed.  
 Creditors benefit from knowing the true characteristics of borrowers, but moral 
hazard hampers direct information sharing (IS) between market participants. IS and 
monitoring activities lie at the base of financial intermediation where a stream in 
financial theory considers that through IS, financial intermediaries can reduce the 
adverse consequences of private information problems and transaction costs.  
 For that matter, the following argument constitutes the base for the present 
study: In P2P lending, the platforms collect valuable information for understanding 
default behavior, sharing it with the lending community in an attempt to mitigate the 
adverse effects of IA, moral hazard and adverse selection.  
 Investors rely on the quality of the rating process, but “soft and self-reported” 
information also play important roles in the screening process (RUIZ-UGARTE, 
2010).  Authors such as Khwaja et al. (2009) found that lenders infer the most from 
standard banking “hard” information but likewise they use non-standard information, 
particularly when it provides credible signals regarding borrower´s creditworthiness. 
Some lenders even go further as to check looks and race as observed proxies for 
the determinants of default (DUARTE et al. 2012; RAVINA, 2012).  
 Statistical discrimination around appearance and popularity has not always 
proved effective in understanding delinquent behavior (FREEDMAN; JIN, 2014; 
RAVINA, 2012, POPE; SYDNOR, 2011). In all cases, evidence provides sound 
warning that return-maximizing investors should be careful in interpreting social ties, 
appearance and other social characteristics alone, when screening for loan 
applicants.   
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  Through the platform´ s web-page, backers have access to credit grades, 
direct messaging with borrowers, and allegedly to relevant information about the 
applicant´s characteristics and loan conditions that will help them identify default risk. 
This is an important step further to allow on-line lenders to overcome private 
information problems. In that sense this inquiry attempts to study, from the lender´s 
perspective, the pertinence of the information provided to the backers by the web-
site.   
 In many ways, the present research looks to contribute to the comprehension 
of this new and fast-paced P2P ecosystem. For one thing, notwithstanding the 
existence of extant literature about credit rating and its effect over on-line lending 
behavior (Cf. BACHMANN, et al., 2011 for a survey), academic work in the field 
tends to concentrate geographically in developed countries like the United States, 
Germany and other European countries, or in China as well, where P2P lending 
activities have flourished in the recent past (WAN et al., 2016).  
 Most studies use rich data sets from P2P platforms such as Prosper, Lending 
Club and Smava, and in that sense, to the best of our knowledge this study is one of 
the few that analyzes lending behavior in on-line communities in emerging countries, 
particularly in Latin America where this activity is relatively new. From the lenders, 
academics and policy maker’s perspective, this research is important because it´s 
one of the first that considers the Mexican crowdfunding and P2P ecosystems, 
currently under construction. 
 This investigation identifies relevant variables based on collected 
demographic and financial characteristics and, using a multivariate regression 
analysis framework, estimates default probabilities and analyzes the effect of gender 
on delinquent behavior, after controlling by loan quality. Finally and based on gender 
and age, this study examines the loan survival times of borrowers in order to provide 
a better view of the possibility of differential non-payer behavior in the Mexican P2P 
environment.  
 To preview our results the model shows that information provided by the 
platforms and available to financiers is relevant for analyzing credit risk, yet not 
conclusive. The most important determinants for increasing the odds of delinquent 
 
 
 
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/] 
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License 
 
5 
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P) 
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 9, n. 1, January - March 2018 
ISSN: 2236-269X 
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v9i1.537 
 
 behavior, besides the credit score are those related to the ratio of monthly payment 
to income and having been refinanced on the same platform.  
 On the other hand, loan purpose and being female reduce such odds. 
Characterized by credit rating, being a female applicant is relevant in positively 
determining loan default only in credit scores C and F, consequently there is no 
conclusive evidence that, under equal credit characteristics, lenders might benefit by 
screening default behavior by gender in this sample. However it was found that 
women have longer loan survival times measured in months (9.2) than men (5.4).  
 Overall, at equal credit ratings, women have better default behavior, as 
measured by loan survival times alone.  The above mentioned results are in line with 
those found in the incipient literature of P2P lending and contribute to three streams 
of knowledge; Being, the effects of case and statistical discrimination in financial 
services, the study of determinants of default and differential attitudes toward 
delinquency by gender and age, and research in the recent field of P2P lending.  
 The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section II provides an 
overview of the existing literature. The generality of lending processes at P2P 
platforms and data collected are described in Section III. Section IV provides the 
research hypothesis and the test methodology. Section V reports the estimation 
results of the logistic model and the survival tables and Section VI concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 P2P lending is a new method of informal finance initiated in the U.K and which 
is also developing apace around the world. This model for loan origination uses the 
internet to directly connect borrowers with on-line communities. Various authors 
have studied the up-surge and evolution of market-place lending (BERGER; 
GLEISNER, 2009; BACHMANN et al., 2011).  
 With limited participation of financial intermediaries, these types of platforms 
facilitate unsecured micro-credits. Arguably P2P lending gives lenders the 
opportunity to increase their income and offers debtors a means of accessing 
financing which could not have been possible when there are strong requirement for 
approval by the traditional financial intermediaries (Zeng, 2013). 
 Conceptually, financial intermediation (FI) theory sets the foundation for 
market-place lending based on transaction costs (SCHOLES et al. 1976). It has 
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 been argued that FI could be used for alleviating the effects of market failures such 
as adverse selection and moral hazard (PAULY, 1974; AKERLOF, 1970; ALLEN; 
SANTOMERO, 1997).  
 Hence, information asymmetry (IA) is perhaps, one of the most important 
sources of concern in finance markets, leading to credit rationing (STIGLITZ; 
WEISS, 1981). IA stems from the fact that borrowers are better informed than 
lenders about their ability and willingness to repay the debt (credit risk) and the 
propensity for early payment (re-investment risk).  
 Creditors benefit from knowing the true characteristics of debtors, but moral 
hazard hampers direct IS between market participants (LELAND; PYLE, 1977), and 
verification by outside parties may be either costly or impossible (TOWNSEND, 
1979). An important stream in financial theory considers that financial intermediaries 
provide the means to reduce the economic consequences of private information 
problems and transaction costs exchanges (DIAMOND; DYBVIG, 1983; DIAMOND, 
1984; LEVINE et al. 2000).  
 The effect of IA over nonpayment behavior has been quantified by Karlan and 
Zinman (2009), who in their study about the South African credit markets, found that 
about 15% of default was due to private information problems. Literature suggests 
that  IS may overcome adverse selection and reduce moral hazard, by raising 
borrowers’ effort to repay loans (JAPPELLI; PAGANO, 2006) or by avoiding 
excessive lending when each borrower may patronize several banks (BENNARDO; 
PAGANO, 2007).  Brown et al. (2009) showed that IS relates with improved 
availability and lower cost of credit to firms in transition economies.   
 In the case for P2P lending, there is very little assurance on the part of the 
lender that the borrower, having been possibly rejected by other financial 
intermediaries, will repay the loan (ZENG, 2013).  
 Weiss et al. (2010) found evidence that the screening of potential borrowers is 
a major instrument in alleviating adverse selection preventing the online market to 
collapse. Information availability improves lender screening and dramatically reduces 
the default rate for high-risk credits, but has little effect on low-risk loans (MILLER, 
2015).   
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  Given the importance of credit rating, Moro et al. (2015) found that credit 
scoring is the main application used for predicting risk and supporting the loan 
approval process. In a joint effort with credit rating agencies, valuable information for 
understanding default behavior is shared with the lending communities by the 
platforms. Investors rely on credit scoring and the quality of the rating process in 
market-place loans, nevertheless “soft and self-reported” information also play 
important roles in their internal systems for decision making (KHWAJA, et al., 2009; 
FREEDMAN; JIN, 2014; DUARTE, et al., 2012; RAVINA, 2012).   
 Based on a statistical discrimination approach (PHELPS, 1972; ARROW, 
1973), lenders have the opportunity to check the debtor´s credit grades, work and 
academic history, property, income to debt ratios and subjective information 
regarding use of credit, communication capacities and social ties in an attempt to 
separate payers from non-payers (RUIZ-UGARTE, 2010).  
 Moreover, Zhang and Liu (2012) in their study about the herding behavior 
among backers at Prosper found that investors infer the solvency of borrowers by 
observing decisions of other creditors, and by using the publicly observable borrower 
characteristics.  
 There is a somewhat richer literature explaining funding success in P2P loans, 
but this is by no means exhaustive (LEE; LEE, 2012; YUM, et al. 2012; LIN et al. 
2013; GONZALEZ; LOUREIRO, 2014; ZHANG; LIU, 2012). For example, 
Herzenstein et al. (2008) showed that debtors’ financial strength, their listing and 
publicizing efforts and their demographic attributes, have an effect over the likelihood 
of funding success. In their study about P2P loan bidding, Weiss et al., (2010) 
showed that the most important factor used by lenders to allocate funds is the rating 
assigned by the P2P lending site. 
 The empirical evidence evaluating non-payment behavior in P2P lending is 
limited and geographically concentrated in developed countries. To the best of our 
knowledge there are no studies analyzing such behavior in Latin America, or Mexico 
specifically.  
 As per the literature, in recent studies about determinants of default behavior 
based on platforms like Lending Club (Serrano-Cinca et al. 2015), the authors tested 
the pertinence of variables that were classified according to the following categories: 
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 borrower assessment, loan characteristics, borrower characteristics, credit history, 
indebtedness and income related information. The factors explaining default were 
loan purpose, annual income, current housing situation, credit history and 
indebtedness and a model for predicting defaults was also estimated.  
 Emekter et al. (2015) found that variables like credit grade, debt-to-income 
ratio, FICO score and revolving line utilization played an important role in loan 
defaults while Dietrich and Wernli (2016) showed that borrower-specific factors such 
as its economic status significantly influence lender evaluations of the borrower’s 
credit risk and thus the interest rates offered. Studies on the default behavior in the 
credit card market in Mexico, consider, as determinants, variables such as loan 
history, payment-income ratios and loan characteristics, factors that are usually 
included in parametric credit scoring models (García et al. 2015) and are consequent 
with the regulation and procedures established by the Mexican Banking Commission 
(CNBV, 2014).  
3. DATA COLLECTION 
 As part of the application process, platforms collect quantitative and 
qualitative information about solicitants. Using credit rating algorithms and a 
minimum of human intervention, the platforms evaluate, approve and grade the 
loans if appropriate. As it is the norm in the credit industry, their model factors 
elements such as credit history, payment capacity and other pieces of information, 
some of them used traditionally in parametric credit analysis.  After the loan has 
been formalized it is submitted to their on-line lending community. Data collected and 
included in the study is first described in Table 1. 
Table 1: Variables provided for the study 
Variables Description Type 
RQAMT Requested amount in pesos (original)d Scale 
Amount_less_100000 Is requested amount less than 100,000 MP? (Coded)e Binarya 
Approved Was the loan approved? (Coded)e Binarya 
LTERM Loan Term in months (original)d Scale 
Short_Term Is Term less than 12 months? (Coded)e Binarya 
CONSDEBT Is the purpose of loan to consolidate debt? (Coded)e Binarya 
BUSINESS Is the purpose of loan finance business? (Coded)e Binarya 
CARLOAN Is the purpose a car loan? (Coded)e Binarya 
HOME Is the purpose of loan home improvements? (Coded)e Binarya 
EDUC Is the purpose of loan education? (Coded)e Binarya 
Gender_of Is the gender male?  (Coded)e Binarya 
Marriage Is the status of women married? (Coded)e Binarya 
AMOUNT_FUNDED Actual amount funded (original)d Scale 
LRATE Loan rate in % (original)d Scale 
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 GRADE 7 categories for credit grade (A-G) (Coded)e Ordinalb 
Credit_Risk Is credit grade Prime (C1 or less)? (Coded)e Binarya 
Default Coded DV. Is loan delinquent or bad credit? (Coded)e Binarya 
Funding_Time weeks elapsed from registration to payment (Coded)e Scale 
Success_Funding Scale from 1 = a week through 6 = 2 months (Coded)e Ordinalc 
REFINANCED Was the loan refinanced? (Coded)e Binarya 
INVESTORS Number of investors per loan (original)d Scale 
Dec_INCOME Self-reported monthly income (original)d Scale 
Paid_capital Loan amortization (original)d Scale 
Balance Amount- Paid_capital (Calculated) Scale 
PMT_Balance Ratio of monthly payment to balance (Calculated) Scale 
Monthly_PMT Monthly payment (original)d Scale 
PMT_Income Ratio of payment to income (Calculated) Scale 
Credit_Mos Loan number of months to date (time effect) (Calculated) Scale 
OWNAUTO Owns car? (Coded)e Binarya 
OWNHOUSE Owns home? (Coded)e Binarya 
GRAD_UG Declared graduate or undergraduate studies (Coded)e Binarya 
Table 1 Continued   
METRO Lives in the Mexico City Area? (Coded)e Binarya 
AGE Age of applicant (Calculated) Scale 
Under_25 Is age under 25 years old? (Coded)e Binarya 
Male Is the borrower male? (Coded)e Binarya 
Female Is the borrower female? (Coded)e Binarya 
Previous_loan Borrowed before in the platform? (Coded)e Binarya 
Default_mos Months in delinquency (Calculated) Scale 
Days_default Days in delinquency (Calculated) Scale 
Notes: aBinary response variables: 0=No, 1=Yes. bOrdinal 7 categories for Credit Grade from A down to G,  A-
grade being the safest. cordinal 6 categories, from 1 being up to one week of funding time through 6 
corresponding to more than 2 months to complete funding. d(original) = variable directly in the sample. eCoded by 
researcher. 
 Our dataset includes 25,598 loan applications filed in the period from June 
2012 through February of 2016. Loan approval rates depend on the product and are 
defined by management. Usually the approval strategy is designed around reducing 
risk by selecting only those applicants who are thought to have a very low risk of 
defaulting, thus the proportion accepted and the proportion of those accepted who 
subsequently default is inversely related. As per the information provided, the main 
cause for loan denial was the inability to meet one or more approval requirements. 
The descriptive statistics for variables in the data-set are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for variables in the study 
Variables M SD Range n 
RQAMT 72,373 72,307  5,000-250,000 25,998 
Ammount_less_100000 .78 .42  0-1 25,998 
Approved .05 .21  0-1 25,998 
LTERM 27.42 9.98  7-120 25,598 
Short_Term .24 .43  0-1 25,598 
CONSDEBT .41 .49  0-1 25,998 
BUSINESS .23 .42  0-1 25,998 
CARLOAN .07 .25  0-1 25,998 
HOME .11 .32  0-1 25,998 
EDUC .06 .24  0-1 25,998 
Gender_of .65 .48  0-1 25,998 
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 Marriage .64 .48  0-1 8,940 
AMOUNT_FUNDED 74,254 59,906  0 – 250,000 1,161 
LRATE 19.74% 3.76% 8.9%-27.9% 1,161 
GRADE 4.27 1.27  1-7 1,161 
Credit_Risk .13 .34  0-1 1,161 
Default .11 .32  0-1 1,161 
Funding_Time 3.21 2.19  0 – 6 1,161 
Success_Funding .29 .46  0-1 1,161 
Table 2 Continued     
REFINANCED .06 .23  0-1 1,161 
INVESTORS 61.22 46.68  0 – 336 1,161 
Multiple_Investors .50 .50  0-1 1,161 
DecINCOME 22,838 22,306  2,600 – 27,648 1,161 
Paid_capital 18,285 22,110   0 – 250,000 1,161 
Balance 55,968 54,558   0 – 250,000 1,161 
PMT_Balance .11 .56  0 -11.95 1,161 
Monthly_PMT 3,498 2,729  352 -23,946 1,161 
PMT_Income .18 .11  .009 – 1.55 1,161 
Credit_Mos 17.41 10.98  0 – 48 1,161 
OWNAUTO .67 .47  0-1 1,161 
OWNHOUSE .47 .50  0-1 1,161 
property .77 .42  0-1 1,161 
GRAD_UG .85 .35  0-1 1,161 
METRO .42 .49  0-1 1,161 
AGE 36.67 .82  17-82 1,161 
Over_60 .04 .19  0-1 1,161 
Under_25 .05 .22  0-1 1,161 
Male .67 .47  0-1 1,161 
Female .33 .47  0-1 1,161 
Previous_loan .15 .36  0-1 1,161 
Rural .04 .19  0-1 1,161 
Median_Income .76 .43  0-1 1,161 
Default_mos 7.88 7.92  .27 – 37.7 130 
Days_default 236 237  0 – 1165 130 
Notes: n = 25,598 refers to the total loan applications: n = 1, 1161 to approved loans, n = 8,940 to women in the 
sample and n =130 to defaulted loans. 
 Of total applicants, 65% are men and 35% women. The loan denial rate for 
men was 94.6% for men and 93.3% for women. Grouped by gender, in this section 
data collected through the platform is first described in Table 3. 
Table 3: Results of t-tests and Descriptive Statistics of variables in the dataset, 
grouped by gender 
  Men   Women   95% CI for Mean 
Difference 
    
Variable M SD n M SD n t df 
          Loan characteristics         
RQAMT 74,772 73,461 16,650 67,910 69,893 8,948 5,033 , 8,690 7.36* 19,105 
LTERM 27 10 16,650 27.61 9.88 8,948  -.54, -.03  -2.21* 18,565 
LRATE 19.6% 3.8% 774 20.1% 3.7% 387  -.97% -.06%  -2.21* 1,159 
INVESTORS 63 48 774 57 44 387 1.03, 12.42  2.32* 1,159 
REFINANCED 5.3% 22.4% 774 7.0% 25.5% 387  -4.7%, 1.3% -1.1 690 
CONSDEBT 40.8% 49.1% 16,650 41.8% 49.3% 8,948  -2.3%, .3% 1.54 18,249 
BUSINESS 24.1% 42.8% 16,650 21.5% 41.1% 8,948  1.5%, 3.6%  4.62* 18,930 
CARLOAN 8.0% 27.2% 16,650 4.9% 21.6% 8,948  2.5%, 3.7% 10.02* 22,053 
HOME 11.3% 31.7% 16,650 11.3% 31.7% 8,948  -.8%, .9% .11 25,596 
EDUC 5.5% 22.7% 16,650 7.2% 25.8% 8,948  -2.4%,-1.1%  -5.33* 16,404 
Property          
 
 
 
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/] 
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License 
 
11 
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P) 
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 9, n. 1, January - March 2018 
ISSN: 2236-269X 
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v9i1.537 
 
 OWNAUTO 51.9% 50.0% 16,650 40.1% 49.0% 8,948  -1.1%, 1.3% 18.32* 18,615 
OWNHOUSE 44.1% 49.7% 16,650 41.8% 49.3% 8,948  1.1%, 3.6%  3.58* 18,412 
GRAD_UG 68.6% 46.4% 16,650 64.2% 47.9% 8,948  3.2%, 5.6%  7.11* 17,799 
AGE 35.3 9.9 16,650 35.3 9.9 8,948  -.31, .21 -.35 24,629 
METRO 37.7% 48.5% 16,650 34.7% 47.6% 8,948  1.8%, 4.3%  4.81* 18,593 
Notes: *p <.05. n = 16,650 for men and n = 8,948 for women. 
 Loan purpose can be assimilated to perceived riskiness by lenders. As 
exhibited on Table 3, debt consolidation (CONSDEBT) is the most self-reported loan 
purpose, followed by financing business (BUSINESS). The Mexico City Metro Area 
(METRO) concentrates more than one third of total applications. The mean loan term 
(LTERM) in months is 27 and the non-weighted loan interest rate charged (LRATE) 
on average was 19.7%.   
 Results of the grouped samples t-tests show that mean requested amount 
RQAMT differ between men (M=74,772, SD =73,461) and women (M=67,910, 
SD=67,910) at the .05 level of significance (t = 7.36, df = 19, 105, n = 25,998, p < 
.05, 95% CI for mean difference is 5,033 to 8690). On average, women requested 
smaller loans than men, (6,962 pesos less). With respect to loan rates, variable 
LRATE also differs (M=19.96%, SD =3.8%) for men and (M=20.1%, SD=3.7%) for 
women at the .05 level of significance (t = -2.21, df = 1,159, n = 1,161, p < .05, 95% 
CI for mean difference is -.97% to .-06%). Female loan rates are quoted 50bp higher 
than those quoted for men. In the sample women are less likely to own property and 
in they do not concentrate in the Mexico City Area as men do.  
 In the platform, filings are classified over 21 categories ranging from A1 being 
the highest quality rating through G3, the lowest. In Table 4, we observe the 
following gender patterns of behavior after controlling for credit rating that is, 
collapsing the full scoring set into a subset comprising only 7 sub-categories, from A 
down to G, A-grade being the safest.  
Table 4: Means and Standard Errors for variables: LRATE, LTERM and RQAMT 
grouped by Grade 
  Men   Women  
Variable/grade M SE n M SE n 
LOAN  RATE 
A 9.65% .16% 28 10.23% .29% 9 
B 13.31% .12% 41 13.40% .18% 16 
C 16.04% .07% 133 16.05% .10% 66 
D 19.07% .05% 229 19.02% .08% 111 
E 21.87% .06% 233 21.83% .07% 107 
F 24.68% .07% 102 24.78% .09% 68 
G 26.90% 2.1E-17% 8 27.40% .17% 10 
LOAN TERM       
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 A 30.00 1.799 28 32.00 2.828 9 
B 33.65 .861 41 32.25 2.112 16 
C 30.56 .704 133 30.67 1.042 66 
D 30.48 .573 229 29.46 .885 111 
E 29.74 .591 233 30.30 .851 107 
F 33.46 1.442 102 29.29 1.157 68 
G 33.00 3.000 8 29.90 5.740 10 
Amount       
A 120,464.30 13,867.62 28 136,666.70 30,092.45 9 
B 91,560.98 10,705.65 41 101,187.50 16,825.13 16 
C 83,630.08 5,391.32 133 93,878.79 9,471.35 66 
D 93,310.04 4,467.80 229 80,666.67 6,551.46 111 
E 101,055.80 4,872.76 233 84,943.93 6,651.94 107 
F 129,098.00 7,910.49 102 105,147.10 10,590.73 68 
G 140,375.00 19,858.37 8 112,600.00 25,800.60 10 
Notes: Credit rating (Grades) collapse the full scoring set (21 categories) into a subset comprising only 7 sub-
categories, from A down to G, A-grade being the safest. N = 1,161 loans approved. 
As can be observed in Table 4, for loans of the same quality, women in 
general pay higher rates and borrow greater amounts than men, especially at the 
safest categories.   
Defaulted loans are those that are charged-off, refinanced and/or late in 
payment. Good status loans are loans that are fully paid or current in payment 
schedule. For that matter the rate of default in this article is defined as:  .  
Default is the dependent variable (DV) in this study and it´s a binary response coded 
variable which is equal to 1 if the loan has defaulted and 0 otherwise. The simple 
mean rate of default for men is 11.76% and 10.07% for women. Classified by grade, 
as can be observed in Table 5, there are no significant differences by gender in 
actual default rates. 
Table 5: Results of t-test and Descriptive Statistics for Default by gender, classified 
over Credit Grades 
  Men   Women       
Outcome M SE n M SE n t dfa 
        A 0 0 28 0 0 9  --  -- 
B .049 .03 41 .063 0.25 16 .19 24 
C .070 .02 133 .030 0.02 66 -1.64 187 
D .122 .02 229 .100 0.03 111 -.65 236 
E .120 .02 233 .150 0.03 107 .73 189 
F .210 .04 102 .130 0.04 68 -1.27 159 
G .125 .13 8 .000 0.00 10 -1.00 7 
Notes: adf: Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom. *p < .05 
    4. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND TEST METHODOLOGY 
 The research question addressed in this study is what are the elements that 
could help lenders characterize default risk in P2P loans? Given the fact that on-line 
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 investors are exposed to the totality of credit risk, besides credit scoring, lending, 
web-sites must provide pertinent information for overcoming the adverse effect of IA. 
Default probabilities by grade are not directly observed by backers therefore it is 
believed that they can rationally benefit from statistical discrimination by factoring in 
information believed to be correlated with default probabilities.  
 From a set of collected variables, mostly available to the on-line community, 
this study will attempt to identify, which of them are pertinent for assessing default 
rates. Previous studies on P2P non-payment behavior, at first, guide our variable 
selection process (EMEKTER et al. 2015; GARCÍA et al. 2015; WEISS et al., 2010; 
SERRANO-CINCA et al. 2015).  
 In our study, bearing in mind our lenders perspective, and the fact that the 
platform has already factored in a scoring model all the information collected, we will 
be testing whether variables related to loan characteristics, demographics, loan 
performance in the platform, credit purpose, income and debt servicing capacity, 
besides credit scores are correlated with default comportment in the sample.  
 The first hypothesis that would be tested is: Grades, as derived from the 
platform´s credit scoring model are considered determinants of default behavior in 
our P2P lending case. 
 The second hypothesis that follows, in general is: Lenders benefit from 
statistical discrimination in the sense given by Schwab (1986), by factoring variables 
related to loan and demographic characteristics of the applicants: CONSDEBT, 
PMT_Income, Female, Paid_capital, OWNHOUSE, Credit_Mos (time effect), 
REFINANCED in addition to credit scoring variables (GRADE), as provided by the 
lending web-site. In this case, the benefit for investors resides in attaining a better 
knowledge of non-payment behavior by debtors. 
 The third hypothesis is: The gender variable, specifically if the loan applicant 
is a female, is believed to be correlated with default behavior. Therefore, lenders 
may benefit from screening loans by sex, using taste-based discrimination. To be 
able to identify the case discrimination effect of gender we need to control credit 
quality. This hypothesis would be also tested after having controlled by GRADE 
derived from the platform’s credit scoring model. 
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  Our hypotheses testing rely on the reduced form model: 
 Where  is the expected value of  
given . In our case  is the probability of default 
as a function of a set of available information about the borrower. Following Aguilera 
et al. (2006), the logistic regression model used for testing the hypotheses is defined 
in the following way: Let  be a set of continuous or categorical observed 
variables and let us consider n observations of those variables represented in the 
matrix = .  Let Y =  be a sample of a binary response variable  
, associated with the observations in , where   . The logistic 
regression is defined by:  (1) Where  is the expected 
value of  given  and is modelled as: 
 = ,  (2)  where  
are the parameters defining the model and  are the zero mean independent errors 
whose variances are:  , . We define the logit 
transformation .  Here   ) stands for the 
odds of response   , for the observed value of   . The 
logistic regression model can be estimated as a generalized linear model (GLM), 
using the logit transformation as the link function.  In matrix notation the logistic 
regression model can be expressed as: , where ´ is the vector of 
logit transformations as defined above, ( )´ is the vector of 
parameters and X= , the design matrix, with 1=(1,…,1)´ is a n-dimension vector 
of ones.  
 When a binary response outcome is modeled using logistic regression, it is 
assumed that the logit transformation of the outcome has a linear relationship with 
the predictor variables. Thereby the relationship between the response variable and 
its covariates is interpreted through the odds ratio from the parameters of the 
models.  
 In equation (2), the exponential of the jth parameter   , is the odds 
ratio of success , when the jth predictor variable is increased by one unit, 
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 maintaining the other predictors constant. That is the exponential of the  jth 
parameter of the logistic regression model gives the multiplicative change in the 
odds of success.  
 The transformation from probability to odds is a monotonic transformation, 
meaning the odds increase as the probability increases. The logistic model will be 
estimated by the maximum the method and its goodness of fit assessed through the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test (HOSMER; LEMESHOW, 1989). 
 As stated before, the dependent variable (DV) in our regressions is Default, a 
coded binary response variable which is equal to 1 if the loan has defaulted and 0 
otherwise. As it is the case, the hypotheses in this research can be tested by the 
estimated values adopted by the vector of parameters ( )´. The null 
hypothesis states that , or there is no linear relationship in the population.  
 Rejecting such a null hypothesis implies that a linear relationship exists 
between X and the logit of Y. Moreover, in our case, if ,  the corresponding 
variable  is considered to have an effect on the probability of default. The value of 
the coefficient   determines the direction of the relationship between X and the logit 
of Y.  When  larger (or smaller) X values are associated with larger (or smaller) 
logits of Y.  
 Conversely, if  larger (or smaller) X values are associated with smaller 
(or larger) logits of Y  (Peng et al. 2002). For that matter if the parameter in the 
regression is positive, the probability of success increases, and when it´s negative, 
decreases (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989). In our case the (+/-) signs on the 
parameters would indicate that the variables determines that the loan has better 
(worse) chances of defaulting.   
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 From a lender’s perspective, the most important concern in P2P lending is to 
better understand non-payment behavior. It is crucial to be able to screen credits 
using borrower´s characteristics available, which correlate with default probabilities. 
In order to test our hypotheses and before we proceed to the estimation results, we 
implement non-parametric tests to identify significant differences between defaulted 
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 and good loans. After that the model estimates default probabilities using logistic 
regression 1. 
 In Table 6 we present the results of the non-parametric tests, summarizing the 
differences between good and bad loans. In the sample, loan characteristics as 
expressed by values of variables: RQAMT, LTERM, LRATE, GRADE, 
REFINANCED, INVESTORS, Decl_INCOME and Credit_Mos are statistically 
different at the 1% significance level. Specifically, the interest rate and the average 
loan term are higher on a delinquent loan, while amounts borrowed and loan 
amortization are smaller. A greater number of investors back good loans, and the 
time effect is related to bad loans. Interestingly enough, declared monthly income is 
higher on average on delinquent loans, suggesting the need for validating such 
information as provided by the platform.   
Table 6: Nonparametric test of differences between good loans and defaulted loans 
(June 2012–Feb 2016) 
Variables Defaulted Loans 
Good 
Loans 
Chi-
Squared Significance df 
RQAMT* Lower Higher 4.43 .04 1 
LTERM* Higher Lower 4.59 .03 1 
LRATE* Higher Lower 14.14 .00 1 
GRADE* Higher Lower 14.98 .00 1 
REFINANCED* Higher Lower 42.14 .00 1 
INVESTORS* Lower Higher 8.75 .00 1 
DeclINCOME* Higher Lower 24.73 .00 1 
PAID CAPITAL Lower Higher .58 .45 1 
Credit Mos* (time effect) Higher Lower 63.76 .00 1 
Notes: *p <.01. All the variables except Paid Capital are significantly different at the 1% level based on the Chi-
Square statistic value of the Kruskal Wallis Test.  
 For the purpose of testing our hypotheses, in Table 7 we report the results from the 
logistic regression, having Default as the DV. All the estimated coefficients are significant at 
the 1% level, with the exception of GRADE, CONSDEBT and Female which are significant at 
the 5% level. 
 
Table 7: Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Default 
Probabilities 
Predictor B z P>z e
B 
(Odds Ratio) e
BSDX SE 
       Approved Loans 
      Previous_loan  - .715*** - 4.87 0 0.18 .543 .352 
GRADE  .226** 2.204 .028 1.253 1.331 .102 
CONSDEBT  -.462** - 2.134 .033 .63 .794 .217 
PMT_Income  2.818*** 2.782 .005 16.747 .359 1.013 
Female  -.499** - 2.13 .033 .607 .79 .234 
Paid_capital  -.0001*** - 6.838 0 1 .234 .000 
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 OWNHOUSE  .497*** 2.285 .022 1.644 1.282 .218 
Credit_Mos  .136*** 10.587 0 1.146 4.458 .0129 
REFINANCED  2.555*** 7.338 0 12.877 1.823 .348 
constant - 5.128 - 9.877 0 
  
.519 
Notes: *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 The Hosmer and Lemeshow test (1982) confirms that the model is adequate in 
explaining the status of loans with a chi-square value of 12.56 (df=8), and a significance of 
.128. Multi-collinearity is not significant since all SE´s of coefficient estimates are smaller 
than 2. McFadden R2 for the binary regression model is 25% and Nagelkerke´s R2 is 32%. 
The percentage for loans that are correctly classified is 84.53 and a test for misspecification 
using STATA´s™ linktest was not significant at the 5% level. Hence, the probability of default 
for a typical loan in the platform can be obtained through the following equation 3:  
 (3) 
 The first hypothesis tested is the one about the appropriateness of GRADE as 
a determinant of delinquent behavior. In this case B2 is statistically different from 0 at 
a significance level of 1%, hence we reject the null hypothesis and consider the 
platform’ s credit scoring variables as determinant of default in our case. Our results 
thus far suggest that the effect of GRADE over default rates is positive. Specifically 
for this sample, given that the variable Grade ranges from A=1 down to G=7, for a 
one unit increase in the GRADES score we expect to see about a 25.3% in the odds 
of becoming a defaulted loan.  
 The second hypothesis tests the importance of variables related to loan and 
borrower´s characteristics, which beside the credit score, are available to lenders. In 
Table 8 we present the nine predictor variables considered to be the determinants of 
default for our case, as well as their effect over the odds ratio. 
Table 8: Predictor variables, coefficients and odd ratios, ordered by effect on loan 
default 
Predictor B eB (Odds Ratio) effect over odds 
Approved Loans 
  
  
PMT_Income  2.818*** 16.747 Increase 
REFINANCED  2.555*** 12.877 Increase 
OWNHOUSE  .497*** 1.644 Increase 
GRADE  .226** 1.253 Increase 
Credit_Mos  .136*** 1.146 Increase 
Paid_capital  -.0001*** 1 Reduce 
CONSDEBT  -.462** .63 Reduce 
Female  -.499** .607 Reduce 
Previous_loan  - .715*** .18 Reduce  
constant -5.128     
Notes: *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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 As displayed in Table 8, on one hand, the most important determinants for 
increasing the odds of loan default, besides the credit score, are those related to the 
ratio of monthly payment to income and having been refinanced on the same 
platform. On the other hand loan purpose and being a female applicant reduce the 
odds of loan default. 
 For the third hypothesis relating the effect of gender on loan default, after 
controlling by GRADE, we present the results in Table 9. 
Table 9: Odds ratios, standard errors, Z values, significance and Pseudo R 
estimates for predictor variables of loan default 
Predictors/Grade eB (Odds Ratio) SE Z P>z PseudoR 
Grade A 
     No cases 
     Grade B 
    
1.0 
Previous_loan predicts failure completely 
   Table 9 Continued   
Grade C 
    
.32 
Previous_loan** .05 .07 -2.05 .04 
 GRADE 1.00 (omitted) 
   CONSDEBT .54 .40 -.83 .41 
 PMT_Income* .58 3.98 -.08 .94 
 Female* .21 .19 -1.75 .08 
 Paid_capital*** 1.00 .00 -2.77 .01 
 OWNHOUSE .61 .43 -.71 .48 
 Credit_Mos*** 1.21 .06 3.87 .00 
 REFINANCED** 95.85 201.45 2.17 .03 
 _cons .03 .04 -2.95 .00 
 Grade D 
    
.26 
Previous_loan*** .10 .08 -2.8 .01 
 GRADE 1.00 (omitted) 
   CONSDEBT* .47 .19 -1.85 .06 
 PMT_Income 5.37 12.00 .75 .45 
 Female .49 .22 -1.59 .11 
 Paid_capital*** 1.00 .00 -3.52 .00 
 OWNHOUSE*** 3.98 1.67 3.29 .00 
 Credit_Mos*** 1.14 .03 5.37 .00 
 REFINANCED*** 25.92 21.93 3.85 .00 
 _cons .02 .01 -6 .00 
 Grade E 
    
.36 
Previous_loan*** .08 .08 -2.8 0 
 GRADE  1.00 (omitted) 
 
 -- 
 CONSDEBT  .83 .19 -1.85 .66 
 PMT_Income***  397 12 .75 .007 
 Female  1.15 .22 -1.59 .74 
 Paid_capital *** .99 .00 -3.52 0 
 OWNHOUSE  .73 1.67 3.29 .47 
 Credit_Mos *** 1.21 .03 5.37 0 
 REFINANCED** 4.98 21.93 3.85 .013 
 _cons  .01 .01 -6 0 
 Grade F 
    
.25 
Previous_loan     .67 .40 -.67 .503 
 GRADE            1.00 (omitted) 
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 CONSDEBT *    .43 .21 -1.69 .091 
 PMT_Income** 140.70 350.21 1.99 .047 
Female * .41 .21 -1.73 .084 
 Paid_capital     .99 .0000135 -1.63 .102 
 OWNHOUSE     1.45 .70 .78 .435 
 Credit_Mos ***   1.11 .03 3.92 0 
 REFINANCED***     34.00 25.15 4.77 0 
 _cons     .01 .009 -4.14 0 
 Grade G 
     CONSDEBT     predicts failure  completely       
Notes: *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. . GRADE collapses 21 scores into 7 subcategories, from A down to G, A-
grade being the safest. 
 Regarding gender and consequent with the results found by Miller (2015), 
being a female applicant in the context of the Mexican P2P ecosystem, is relevant in 
positively determining loan default only in credit scores C and F, therefore there is no 
conclusive evidence that lenders might benefit by screening default behavior based 
on gender, at equal loan characteristics in this sample. Nonetheless after calculating 
survival times in months the median for women is 9.2 months and 5.4 for men. 
 
Figure 1: Life survival times by gender. This figure shows the proportion of  
surviving loans with the passage of time for men and women. 
Own elaboration from the platform´s s sample 
 
 As displayed in table 10, evidence confirms that overall, women have better 
default behavior when controlling for loan quality as measured by loan survival 
alone, in a consistent with results derived from the estimation of our testing model.  
Table 10: Survival times by gender and GRADE 
Gender GRADE Loan quality 
Median  
Survival times 
Men 
 
B* 20.0 
  
C 6.5 
  
D 3.1 
  
E 5.3 
  
F 4.9 
  
G* 6.8 
Women 
 
B 15.3 
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C* 12.0 
  
D* 4.9 
  
E* 9.5 
  F* 12.2 
Notes: Median survival times in months. Grade* = Higher Survival time by gender 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 This research has investigated the effect of variables related to loan and 
borrower´s characteristics in addition to credit scores in determining default behavior 
in P2P lending in Mexico. Moreover, it tested whether investors might benefit from 
screening loan applicants by loan and demographic characteristics including sex 
after controlling for loan quality, even though gender information is not shared 
explicitly with lenders by the platform. To this end we have used a dataset provided 
by one platform with nation-wide presence in Mexico. The sample contained 
collected variables from loan applications and public information mostly available to 
on-line investors. 
 The results showed that information provided by the platform is relevant for 
analyzing credit risk, yet not conclusive at determining non-payment conduct. In 
congruence with the literature, loan quality as measured, on a reverse scale, by the 
platform´s credit scores is positively associated with default performance. In addition 
the most important determinants for increasing the odds of default are the payment-
to-income ratio and having refinanced the terms of the loan on the same platform.  
 On the contrary loan purpose (a measure of perceived riskiness) and being a 
female applicant reduce such odds. Regarding gender, there is no conclusive 
evidence that, under equal credit characteristics, lenders might benefit by screening 
default behavior by sex in this sample. Moreover, consistent with previous studies by 
Miller (2015), being a female applicant is relevant in positively determining loan 
default only in riskier loans. However it was found that given equal credit ratings 
women have longer loan survival times than men, hence they have better default 
behavior, as measured by loan survival times alone. 
 To the best of our knowledge, this research is one of the first studies about 
P2P lending in Latin America, raising the possibility of including further disclosed 
information and analyzing other cases in the region for comparison purposes.  
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 There are important implications of these findings for lenders, researchers and policy 
makers. Firstly this study contributes in general to the CF literature and provides 
further understanding about the P2P ecosystem in Mexico.   
 Secondly it provides evidence that the on-line community in Mexico might 
benefit from more transparency and information sharing in the P2P lending process 
and highlights the importance of regulation, data generation and disclosure as 
catalysts for this activity in the country. Thirdly, it leverages the discussion around 
creditworthiness and growth potential of women in an emergent economy.  
 Due to the fact that on-line financiers bear all the credit risk, the natural next 
step of this study would be to attain a better perspective about the relationship 
between credit ratings and assigned interest rates, in order to have a clear picture of 
the risk-reward link in P2P lending. 
 There is no need to mention that this research was based on one platform in 
Mexico, notwithstanding the largest. Comparison with other platforms and enriching 
the available datasets are surely, tasks for the future. Nevertheless this effort can be 
considered as the first step towards further academic and institutional discussion 
about the topic.    
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